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The Impact of Pension Freezes on Firm Value
Jordan Rubin

Since 2001, pension freezes have surged in popularity, representing the latest
development in a long-term shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC)
plans. Competitive pressures and an increasingly mobile workforce have driven the 25-year
shift to DC plans, away from the less flexible, more volatile, and often higher-cost DB
programs. A recent confluence of market and regulatory events has further boosted the
popularity of freezes relative to outright terminations. This paper seeks to answer whether
pension freezes increase firm value, as the managers who enact them often proclaim.

In

addition, we study the market’s efficiency in recognizing this potential value change. These
research questions are assessed with an event study using a sample of recent pension freezes
from 2003 through 2006. The results address issues important to the managers who execute
freezes and to the investors who price their effect on firm value.

Background and Prior Literature
Private-sector US workers have long received retirement benefits as a component of
their total compensation. Traditionally, larger corporations have provided for their
employees’ retirement through defined benefit pension programs. DB plans guarantee an
annuity payment upon retirement equal to a formula that includes the employee’s level of
compensation and years of service to the firm; for instance, a retired worker’s benefit might
be computed according to a formula such as:
Benefit = (2%)*(Years of Service)*(Final 3 Years’ Average Salary)*(Inflation Index)
DB plans insure the retiree against longevity and investment risk, leaving the plan
sponsor to fund and manage the plan responsibly. Providing for a workforce’s retirement
creates substantial long-term liabilities for the sponsor. Unlike social security, DB obligations
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are not paid for from operating revenue. Rather, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plan sponsors to fund an investment trust for the benefit of
plan participants. Annually, firms are required to contribute a minimum amount to the fund.
By law, companies must contribute to their plan each year an amount equal to the present
value of the benefits earned by employees that year. Additionally, the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 requires firms to make up for funding shortfalls generally amortized over a sevenyear period.1 If managed incorrectly, these post retirement liabilities may have a crushing
effect on the firm’s solvency and profitability.
A case in point is the struggling domestic auto industry. In 2005, General Motors’
legacy costs including health care benefits came to $1,600 per vehicle (Welch et al., 2005).
Competitor Toyota offers no DB plan; and, on a unit of production basis, pays 90% less in
health care costs than GM (Sloan 2006). Despite an allegedly over-funded DB plan,
mounting benefit cost pressure forced GM to freeze its pension in Q1 2006 (GMC 2006).
Besides the expense burden, long-term DB liabilities2 increase the plan sponsor’s risk
(market, legislative, accounting standard and actuarial), as GM outlines in its 2006 10K
(GMC 2006:21):
Our future funding obligations for our IRS-qualified U.S. defined benefit pension
plans and our estimated liability related to OPEB [Other Post Employment Benefits]3
plans depend upon changes in health-care inflation trend rates, the level of benefits
provided for by the plans, the future performance of assets set aside in trusts for these
plans, the level of interest rates used to determine funding levels, actuarial data and
experience, and any changes in government laws and regulations.
In addition to increasing the sponsor’s financial risk and worsening its competitive
position, DB pensions also make the financial statements inscrutable. Pension accounting is
exceptional in its complexity, opacity, and discretion. This challenges analysts assessing the
economic impact of a firm’s DB plan. As such, there is debate in the literature regarding
investors’ ability to account properly for DB plans in firm valuation.
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Any discussion on pension valuation must begin with an explanation of the DB
pension liability.4 Actuaries and accountants measure pension liability using two approaches:
•

Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO): Includes benefits for vested and non-vested
employees at current salaries

•

Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO): Includes benefits for vested and non-vested
employees at future salaries.

As of 2008, both must be discounted at a corporate bond rate.5 In measuring the above,
managers are given wide discretion in their assumptions, such as future salary increases and
retirement ages. As for plan assets, they are valued at an average of fair market value over the
past two years, so long as this value compared to current fair value does not fall outside a
90%-110% corridor. Ignoring the smoothing and manipulation possible in asset and liability
measurements, the general economic state of the plan is measured as its funded status which
is defined as the PBO minus Plan Assets.
Prior to December 2006, a DB plan’s funded status had little relevance for the income
statement and balance sheet aside from footnote disclosure. Even now, if investors
concentrate on pension items disclosed on income statements and balance sheets, it is all but
certain they will err in their valuations. The income statement reflects pension expense,
which is a heavily smoothed figure. The rationale for this smoothing is to insulate earnings
from such erratic events as plan amendments and investment portfolio returns.
components of pension expense include:
•

Service cost: Increase in PBO due to employees’ labor

•

Interest Cost: Accrued increase in liability due to time value of money

•

Actual Return: Plan asset gains/losses

•

Amortization of Prior Service Cost: Amortization of plan amendments

The
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•

Gain/Loss: Difference between expected and actual investment return plus
recognition of unrecognized gains or losses (determined by a corridor test).

Such smoothing divorces reported financials from market reality.

For example,

management’s expected return assumptions, not actual market conditions, determine the rate
of return on plan assets. Given current rules, management can dramatically boost pension
income, by selecting an expected rate of return on plan which exceeds the liability discount
rate. As for the balance sheet, a DB pension is recognized through accrual of the
aforementioned smoothed pension expense figure. As a safeguard, firms must carry a
minimum liability (ABO-Plan Assets) to ensure the balance sheet does not vary too greatly
from economic reality.
Reform recently came in December 2006 with SFAS No. 158; this new accounting
standard requires firms to indicate their DB pension funded status on the plan sponsor’s
balance sheet. Yet this only goes so far, as the additional disclosure is made through
adjusting Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income rather than sponsor assets or liabilities.
As a result, DB financial statement presentations continue to challenge the valuation skills of
even sophisticated outsiders. It is possible that this difficulty produces confusion over not
only how to assess plans restructuring by freeze or termination, but also how to value
ongoing DB plans.
A prominent alternative to DB plans are DC plans such as 401(k)’s. Under this
model, the plan sponsor is responsible only for an annual contribution to each employee’s tax
deferred retirement account; the participant is responsible for managing his own portfolio.
This latter type of plan is popular among employees because it is transferable across
employers, reduces the problem of job lock, and diminishes dependence on employer
solvency. The US Department of Labor has noted that the percent of firms offering only DC
plans has tripled since 1981 (see Figure 1). A recent Watson Wyatt study of the Fortune
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1000 demonstrates that this trend has accelerated since early this decade (see Figure 2).
VanDerhei (2006) shows that 168,725 DB plans terminated since 1975 (98% of which were
fully funded at termination), leaving 29,000 DB plans surviving.6

Of the surviving plans,

PBGC (2005) shows that 9.4% were hard frozen in 2003, the first year the PBGC collected
freeze data. This freeze statistic is somewhat overstated, since hard frozen plans represent
only 1.8% of active participants. A Towers Perrin study (2004) of multinational firms
demonstrates the global nature of this trend: 20% of respondents, mostly foreign firms, had
completed a freeze or termination with 29% considering such action in the near future.
Figures 1 and 2 here
In general, healthy firms have sought to reduce DB liabilities in one of two ways:
Freeze or Standard Termination. In a standard (or fully funded) termination, the plan sponsor
settles its pension liability by either purchasing an annuity from an insurer that roughly
matches the plan’s ABO (Harper et al. (2007) suggest that conservative actuarial assumptions
make the actual termination liability larger than the ABO), or by dispersing trust assets to
beneficiaries in a lump sum. Terminations are generally feasible only for plans with assets
that exceed the termination liability. In such a case, the firm can capture surplus assets
subject to a 50% excise tax (Latter 2006). Alternatively, the sponsor can freeze the plan: in
this case, plan participants cease to accrue benefits. Freezes may be grouped into three main
categories (Vanderhei 2006):
•

Hard Freeze: All plan participants stop accruing service benefits;

•

Partial Plan Freeze: A portion of participants stops accruing service benefits;

•

Soft Freeze: All plan participants stop accruing service benefits but benefit accruals
based on salary increases continue to be earned.
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The Gain/Loss on a hard freeze is the difference between the PBO and ABO, as the freeze
eliminates future salary increases, less Unrecognized Prior Service Cost and Unrecognized
Gain/Loss.7
Sponsors seeking eventual termination will sometimes freeze their plan first, in order
to slow the rate of liability growth and to allow assets to catch up to liabilities. PBGC (2005)
found that, of plans frozen in 2003, 20% were slated for termination versus 7% for nonfrozen plans.

Periods of low long-term interest rates, such as now, make terminations

especially costly. Low interest rates elevate pension liabilities and boost the cost of
termination. Conversely, low discount rates increase the freeze accounting gain, by widening
the difference between ABO and PBO, making freezes relatively more attractive.
Freezes have grown in popularity since 2001, influenced by falling interest rates and
declining stock prices. Unfortunately, data on pension freezes are limited. The Department of
Labor did not inquire firms about plan freezes on its Form 5500 until 2002, and there is a
five-year lag in data publication. Nevertheless, several benefit consultancies have produced
studies on the issue using client data. Aon (2003) discovered in a study of 1000 clients that
2% of the sample plans had implemented a freeze before 2001, while 21% had taken action to
freeze or were actively considering a freeze post-January 2001. In late 2006, 10% of surveyed
Hewitt Associates’ (2007) DB clients said they were “somewhat or very likely” to freeze
their plans.
What have been the factors driving DB plans’ long decline and the recent popularity
of freezes? Munnell et al. (2006) propose four primary causes: compensation reduction,
increasing health care costs, financial risk, and the rise of non-qualified plans. We agree with
those authors that, of these four, the most important appears to be financial risk and
compensation reduction. Certainly rising health care costs and the creation of executive only,
non-qualified plans have contributed to the decline. Yet Munnell et al. (2006) note that
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nations without these issues, Canada and the United Kingdom, have also experienced an
increase in freezes. In separate surveys, Mercer (2006) (see Figure 3) and Aon (2003) found
that managers who had recently changed their DB plan design cited “Long Term Cost
Savings” and “Reduced Cost Volatility” as top reasons for their decision.
Figure 3 here
It has been widely noted that firms laden with DB liabilities are finding themselves at
a disadvantage when competing with global rivals and start-ups who do not bear similar cost
burdens. Mercer (2006) has pointed out that firms with low profit margins are more apt to
freeze their plans. Often, management elects to reduce benefits, as opposed to cutting
employees’ take home pay. A DB pension freeze can enhance the plan sponsor’s financial
position substantially, inasmuch as the average funding requirement for DB plans is 8% of
payroll while the standard matching rate for 401(k) plans is only 3% (Munnell et al. 2006).
This cost differential between DB and DC plans widens substantially for sponsors obliged to
pay costly catch up contributions because of underfunding.
In practice, of course, converting from a DB to a DC plan will often involve some
additional 401(k) contributions to indemnify the employees’ freeze losses. Full
indemnification estimates are sensitive to return assumptions, but this additional contribution
has been estimated to range from <2% of pay for workers in their early 30s, to >18% for
workers their early 60s.8
Prior studies have suggested that sponsors choosing to freeze their plan tend to be
those which face the most burdensome pension obligations. Mercer (2006) found that a
sample of 15 S&P 500 firms recently freezing their DB plans carried a greater contribution
requirement as a percent of operating cash flow (2 to 3 times higher), than the median S&P
500 DB sponsor. The study conjectured that this was due to low historical returns on plan
assets: their sample plans had a pre-freeze pension liability 118% larger than that of a typical
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S&P 500 sponsor (as a percent of total liabilities). That research corroborates preliminary
results from 2003 Form 5500 data which found that 48% of frozen plans had a funding ratio
(Plan Assets/ABO) below 80%, compared to 35% for non-frozen plans (PBGC 2005). In
other respects, these firms are healthy; Mercer (2006) found their median credit rating
exceeded that of the median S&P 500 sponsor. This led VanDerhei (2006: 6) to observe that
“some of the companies undertaking a pension freeze are doing so more out of a strategic
corporate redesign than in response to immediate financial difficulties.”
Besides cost pressure, another important freeze rationale is risk reduction. Harper et
al. (2007) identify three sources of financial risk: that due to interest rate changes, investment
changes, and demographic changes. Investors, not simply risk averse managers, should care
about these risks because they all appear to be non-diversifiable or systematic. Interest rate
fluctuations are clearly important in the context of pensions due to the long dated discounting
of future cash flows: a 100bp decline in long-term interest rates increases plan liabilities by
between 15% and 20% (Harper et al. 2007). Investment risk and the impact of fluctuating
capital markets have been especially apparent in the past decade. With a large percentage of
plan assets invested in equities, many plans in fact required no contributions in the late 1990s.
But as stock prices and interest rates fell in 2001, plan liabilities rose just as asset values
deteriorated. This resulted in a surge in contributions (see Figure 4) and brought to light the
systematic risk DB plans create for their sponsors. GMC (2006:21) outlined in its 2006 10K
the investment and interest rate risk it faces as one of the nation’s largest plan sponsors:
…[O]ur employee benefit plans hold a significant amount of equity securities. If the
values of these securities decline, our pension and OPEB expenses would increase
and, as a result, could materially adversely affect our business. Any decreases in
interest rates, if and to the extent not offset by contributions and asset returns, could
increase our obligation under such plans. We may be legally required to make
contributions to the pension plans in the future, and those contributions could be
material.
Figure 4 here
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A freeze reduces investment and rate risk in several ways. First, a freeze shrinks the
size of plan liabilities. The liability will now be the ABO instead of the larger PBO. In
addition, liabilities will grow more slowly, as benefit accruals cease and interest costs
decline. Second, with improved plan solvency, restructuring plan investments to
asset/liability match is more likely (Harper et al. 2007). Asset/liability matching in this case
means that the firm uses low volatility fixed-income investments to hedge rate risk and to
lower investment risk (see Figure 5). Harper et al. (2007) argue that freezes make matching
more likely because post-freeze plans are more solvent, reducing the need to take on high
risk/high return investments. A fully funded plan benefits little from high risk/high return
investments because overfunding is restricted to being applied to future obligations or will be
subject to a 50% excise tax at termination. Finally, many plans freeze simply as a prelude to
termination, the ultimate risk reduction, perhaps waiting for the investment cycle to turn.
Figure 5 here
Demographic risk is an additional problem for plan sponsors. This risk principally
includes the accuracy of actuarial assumptions which Harper et al. (2007) place as well below
that of interest rate and investment risk. On the other hand, Munnell et al. (2006) suggest that
long-term actuarial assumptions may be less accurate with the risk to the downside (e.g. life
span estimations could be too low). Even so, this problem will be slow to impact the pension
system and is an unlikely motivation for today’s managers. More relevant to current sponsors
is the risk of changing pension legislation or accounting rules. Unfortunately for sponsors, the
political pressure for these changes is often highest when DB plans are financially weak. The
Pension Protection Act of 2006 and FASB No. 158 are recent examples of rule-making risk
(Munnell et al. 2006). Firms most exposed to this problem are those with the least solvent
plans, providing additional motivation for them to freeze in advance of any new regulation.
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Mercer (2006) found that its sample of S&P 500 freeze firms stood to lose 7% of
Shareholder’s Equity under FASB No. 158 versus 2% for the median S&P 500 plan sponsor.
If, as argued above, a desire to reduce systematic risk and improve cost structure
motivates pension freezes, then it is reasonable to believe that freezes might create value.
Below, we test the hypothesis that healthy firms experience an increase in firm value as a
result of freezing their DB pensions. We focus on healthy firms, since changes in their value
will be concentrated in equity and because market model parameter estimates will be more
accurate. We focus on all three of the freeze types defined above (hard, partial, and soft),
including those plans closed to new employees. Many of the sample freezes incorporate the
introduction of a revised retirement plan, typically a 401(k) plan with some indemnification
properties (Munnell et al. 2006).
In what follows, when we use market values to see how pension freezes influence
firm value, it is necessary to recognize that this raises questions of market efficiency. Ross
et al. (2005) define a semi-strong efficient market as one where prices fully reflect all
publicly-available information; in turn, this implies that prices adjust instantaneously to
incorporate the release of new public information. On this view, investors would be expected
to incorporate immediately and accurately the effect of DB plan freezes into the market value
of the sponsoring firm. In such a case, one can interpret unexplained market value changes on
the announcement date as “freeze-created” value.

Yet, as we have seen, pensions are

complex, so that investors might not accurately account for their impact on firm value. In the
latter case, markets may be inefficient and it may take some time until a freeze creates value.
In this case, investors would delay pricing freeze-generated value. In other words, it may be
necessary to track a long period post-announcement to detect such value creation.
The literature is unsettled in assessing the market efficiency of pension valuation.
Coronado and Sharpe (2003) come down on the side of inefficient pricing and conclude that
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investors err in pension valuation by capitalizing plans’ contribution to accounting earnings,
as opposed to examining funded status. Those authors claim the effect resulted in investors
overvaluing firms by as much as 5% after the technology bubble burst, when expense
smoothing protected pension earnings from asset losses. Picconi (2006) also finds evidence
of inefficiencies.

He shows that investors fail to properly value both changes in plan

assumptions, as well as the off balance sheet pension liability. On the other side of the debate,
Brown (2004) argues that the market properly discounts firm value when managements make
unrealistic pension assumptions; evidence from the 1980s also suggested that share prices did
faithfully reflect unfunded pension liabilities (c.f. Bulow et al. 1985). Accordingly, the
academic debate over efficient pricing broadens the interest of this study beyond testing for
an increase in firm value, to observing how long it takes for the DB freeze to influence
market valuation.

Methodology
To test the value-creation hypothesis, we employ an event study. We hypothesize that
the abnormal return measured after the event date should equal the economic impact of the
event, under the efficient market assumption. MacKinlay (1997) notes that event studies are
often preferred to an examination of operational data that can take years to reflect any given
corporate action. To perform the analysis, we used the Eventus software and the CRSP
database, and evaluate how values respond over a long test interval. Gathering a list of DB
pension freezes proved difficult, since freezes are too recent to be included in available DOL
Form 5500 data, and announcement mechanisms vary by company. Most existing freeze
studies have relied upon private consulting firm data (PBGC 2006). Fortunately, a database of
healthy company freezes from aggregating publicly available information is available from
CRR (2007); 9 that list of 20 or so freezes covers the period 2003-06.
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We examine the freeze-generated value hypothesis over both long and short-term test
intervals, due to uncertainty regarding market efficiency. Separate portfolios are generated
for both the long and short-term analysis (see Table 1); we exclude from the sample foreign
firms, private firms, and firms with a merger that occurred during the test or estimation
interval.10 In addition, the long-term portfolio excludes freezes occurring in late 2006, to
ensure that each firm has at least 200 trading days of post-announcement returns. The shortterm portfolio includes the late 2006 freezes but excludes freezes announced within one day
of an earnings release date. We define the event date as the first trading day on or after the
announcement date.11
Table 1 here
Calculating abnormal returns requires a return estimation model; and in this analysis,
we rely upon the familiar single-factor market model:12

R jt = α j + βmt + ε jt .
Here, R jt is the return of the jth sample on day t and the error term is assumed to have
expected value zero. Parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The
event date is t=0, while the estimation interval, t = [-31, -286] is approximately one year and
does not overlap the test interval. The market portfolio is defined as the CRSP Equal
Weighted Index. In this framework, the daily abnormal returns or prediction error is A jt :

A jt = R jt − (α j + β j Rmt ) .
Eventus reports two abnormal return statistics for the sample firms over the test interval
[T1,T2]: Cumulative Abnormal Average Return (CAAR) and the Average Compound
Abnormal Return (ACAR). The CAAR calculation begins with determining each sample’s
Average Abnormal Return (AAR) over N trading days:
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N

AART1 ,T2 = ∑ A jt / N .
j =1

These AARs are then aggregated across all, N, samples to form the CAAR:
N

CAART1 ,T2 = (∑∑t =2 T A jt ) / N .
T

j =1

1

To calculate the ACAR, we need to first determine the daily buy and hold abnormal return
(BHAR) for each sample:

T2

BHAR j ,T1 ,T2 = [∏ (1 + R jt ) − 1] − [(1 + α j )
t =T 1

(T2 −T1 +1)

T2

− 1] − β j [∏ (1 + R jt ) − 1] .
t =T1

These BHARs are then aggregated across all samples to form the CAAR:
N

ACART1 ,T2 = (∑ BHAR j ,T1 ,T2 ) / N .
j =1

CAAR is the most reasonable method for aggregating returns and calculating test
statistics but Eventus reports the ACAR to simulate the return an investor would realize
implementing this strategy. The test statistics calculated for the returns are a Patell –Z Test
and a Generalized Sign Test.13 The Patell –Z Test standardizes each security’s standard error
and assumes cross sectional independence among the samples. The null hypothesis for the
Patell-Z Test is CAART1 ,T2 = 0 , while the Generalized Sign Test compares the percent of
samples with positive AAR in the estimation and test intervals. The expected abnormal
return is positive; therefore, all Z-scores are converted to p-values on a one-tailed basis
Our analysis examines three sets of test intervals, or windows: Pre-Announcement,
Event Straddle, and Post-Announcement. The Pre-Announcement window, t = [-30, -1], tests
the state of the firm pre-announcement and for information leakage. The Event Straddle, t =
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[-1, +1], tests for short term announcement reaction and controls for information leakage and
announcement date uncertainty. The Post-Announcement intervals, t = [+1, +50], [+1, +150],
[+1, +200] and [+1, +250], test for long-term announcement reaction and possible market
inefficiency.

Empirical Findings
Table 2 summarizes results. What we see is that abnormal returns eventually move
upward after the freeze, as anticipated, the reaction is both prolonged and delayed. Even if
we control for announcement method (press release/news report or SEC filling) and include
an announced projected financial improvement dummy variable, the short-term results are
insignificant. Accordingly, using the short-term portfolio, we fail to disprove the null
hypothesis.
Table 2 here
Interestingly, after flat performance 50 days post-freeze, the CAAR then jumps almost
10% over the next 50 days [+51, +100]; it then continues to rise at a decreasing rate over the
next seven months (see Tables 3 and 4). Through day 250, the sample generates a CAAR that
is significantly positive (25.60%, p<.0001). Not only is this return positive, but the results
reflect wide breadth across the sample (12 of 14 are positive), indicating the analysis does not
hinge on one particular case. In addition, the chronology of stock price reaction is fairly
uniform across samples, demonstrated by the breadth of stability and strength in the [+1, +50]
(50% positive) and [+51, +100] (79% positive) periods, respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 here
It is possible that the lagged price effect represents market inefficiency. That is, if the
freeze effect is properly measured, the fact that the market delays in pricing the pension
freeze supports prior research questioning investor ability to incorporate complex pension
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data accurately. In the freeze case in particular, the lagged response may be a result of the
accounting rules governing freeze gain and loss recognition.

Under SFAS No. 88,

curtailment gains are recognized as realized (freeze effective date), while losses are
recognized at commitment date (announcement date). In our sample, the average difference
between the effective and announcement dates is 152 calendar days. And taking into account
the 10K/Q publication delay, the accounting rule results in a nearly 6-month lag in potential
gain recognition. In addition, annual, not quarterly, disclosure of detailed pension data in the
financial statement notes allows sponsors to delay publication of the freeze impact for a
substantial period.

Thus our findings are supportive of Picconi (2004), who finds that

investors and analysts take time to incorporate new and complex pension information. His
work specifically focuses on changes in pension plan rate assumptions, and he concludes that
investors and analysts alike wait many months, until the change in assumptions impacts
quarterly earnings, to modify financial expectations (Picconi 2004: 26):
Rather than specifically gleaning the information by referring to the disclosed
information, both investors and analysts seem to gradually incorporate this
information by observing its effects on earnings. Since all this information is publicly
available, information assimilation would appear to drive this inefficiency.
This explanation may be weaker with respect to freezes, which are widely covered in the
financial press and analyst community, but the same mechanisms may be responsible for our
results.
It is possible that the observed delayed response to the DB freeze enhances the
possibility that some confounding variable could be at least partially responsible for the
reaction. Undertaking a pension freeze could be a leading indicator for another, more causal
variable, making the correlation discovered above spurious. For example, pension freezes
could be positively correlated with the introduction of better management practices. For
instance, in the case of Hewlett-Packard, CEO Mark Hurd froze the pension plan three
months into the job, having come to HP after an acclaimed stint at another sample firm, NCR,
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where he also froze the DB plan. Perhaps competent managers today must freeze their DB
plans to create value, yet some of the observed value creation could be the result of their
other actions. As an aside, the Mark Hurd example introduces another potential problem:
HP’s freeze was widely anticipated when Hurd was hired as CEO, given his history at NCR
(CNN/Money.com 2005). Yet we there is no evidence that the market expected DB freezes
in other sample firms; insignificant abnormal returns over the [-30, -1] window support this
assumption.
Another potential explanation could be the influence of other restructuring activity.
Almost all of the sample firms were in the midst of a broader restructuring and the pension
freeze could have been just one component of a larger overhaul (see Table 5). In this case, a
DB freeze could simply be coincidental, but might not itself create much value. For example,
having a freeze might indicate that the firm has a weak or non-existent union, allowing for
deeper and more significant cost-cutting measures. In fact, PBGC (2005) found that 7% of
union plans reported a hard frozen status in 2003 compared to 10% for non-union plans.
Alternatively, freezes could designate a willingness on management’s behalf to take
unpopular but necessary actions to cut costs. Eight of the 13 firms in our sample reporting a
restructuring made a major restructuring announcement after or on the freeze date, creating
considerable risk that restructuring announcements contaminated the test interval.

And

restructurings announced before the freeze event could also influence our results.
Unfortunately, layoffs and plant closings are more uncertain than pension freezes and
investors may wait for realization of firms’ initial restructuring plans before capitalizing their
projected effects.
Table 5 here
We have tested for evidence of these factors, on the grounds that if freezes are valueenhancing, results ought to be sensitive to variables that would influence the economic
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impact of the freeze (e.g. type of freeze, funded status, size of plan). Unfortunately, including
these factors offers no further insight on the long or short-term results. Of course the latter are
very imperfect measures of a freeze’s financial impact because they are subject to substantial
accounting smoothing and may be unrealistic.

We have also asked whether market model

parameter values changed between the estimation and test periods. Practitioners sometimes
use a rolling beta estimate to overcome this problem. Eventus offers a methodology entitled
Event Parameter Approach to allow joint estimation of model parameters and abnormal
returns; this test yields a CAAR(0, +200) of 22.98% (.009% p-value), implying the results of the
original study are robust to joint estimation. Another statistical concern might be the
assumption of independence of abnormal returns and the event date (Dwyer 2001). We find
that abnormal returns several hundred days before the event date are not statistically
significant in either direction, supporting the independence assumption. A last potential
problem we note is the possibility that the sample CAARs may not have zero covariance.
While the Patell-Z test makes the assumption that covariance among the samples CAARs is
zero, several of the long term test intervals overlap. One solution would be to examine each
of the sample CAARs independently, without aggregation (MacKinlay 1997), who also
suggests categorizing the events by date to form non-overlapping portfolios. We leave this for
future research.
In sum, some of the observed value creation may derive from activities separate from
the pension freeze, but we conclude that DB freezes were both value-enhancing and
unexpected. The fact that we find freeze value creation and market inefficiency is also
supportive of prior findings.
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Discussion and Conclusion
We have detected a powerful lagged relationship between excess positive returns and
DB freezes by plan sponsors.

Our results confirm expectations and existing literature,

leading to the observation that the relationship is causal. The fact that the impact takes a long
time to be seen may disappoint executives hoping a DB freeze will result in a clear and
immediate boost in market value. In any case, we show that the market eventually shows a
benefit from switching from a DB to DC regime through the freeze mechanism. Investors’
verdict on this issue will only hasten the decline of DB plans.
Replication of this work in a few years may give some indication of whether
modifications to accounting standards have the effect of correcting pension related market
distortions. Future research could also delve further into whether the freeze has an impact
per se, or whether it proxies for good management and restructuring. Management’s nonfreeze activity might be studied by observing changes in operating margins (ex. pension
expense) relative to peers. Or one could estimate the present value of the freeze directly,
instead of inferring it from market data. The estimation could be carried out using firms’
financial projections often released with a freeze announcement. Expanding the sample size
would increase power and possibly allow for separate, non-over lapping portfolios to address
clustering.
It is worth noting that, irrespective of the precise causal relationship, the substantial
and consistent delayed price reaction presents an investment opportunity. This inefficiency
may not persist in the future, however, in view of recent regulatory changes aimed at
improving pension transparency and financial statement recognition.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Wage and Salary Workers with Pension Coverage by Type of
Plan*
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*Note: Includes plans with 100 or more participants
Source: Graphic recreated from Buessing and Soto. (2006). 3.
Data: 1981 and 1992 from Department of Labor tabulations, 2003 from CRR calculations

Figure 2. The Accelerating Decline of DB plans among the Fortune 1000
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Figure 3. Management’s Most Important Factors for Plan Design Change
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Figure 4. Pension Plan Contributions to Defined Benefit Plans*
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Figure 5. Asset/Liability Matching Illustration

Source: Graphic taken from Harper et al. (2007). 4.
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Figure 7. Growth of the CAAR over the Test Period – Long Term Portfolio
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Table 1. DB Pension Freezes Considered for Inclusion in Event Study
Included Events
Firm

Freeze Type

LT Port.

ST Port.

10/28/2003

1/1/2004

New Empl.

Yes

Yes

1/28/2004
5/26/2004

1/1/2005
9/1/2004

Partial
Partial

Yes
Yes

No (Earnings)
Yes

Circuit City Stores

10/29/2004

2/28/2005

Total

Yes

Yes

IBM
Motorola
Hewlett-Packard

12/9/2004
12/17/2004
7/19/2005

1/1/2005
1/1/2005
1/1/2006

Partial
New Empl.
Partial

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Aon
Sears Roebuck
NCR

Freeze Date

Effective Date

Lockheed Martin

10/6/2005

1/1/2006

New Empl.

Yes

Yes

Verizon

12/6/2005

6/30/2006

Partial

Yes

Yes

1/6/2006

1/1/2008

Total

Yes

Yes

1/17/2006

3/1/2006

New Empl.

Yes

Yes

IBM
ALCOA
Lexmark International
Ferro
Coca-cola Bottling
DuPont
Hershey
Citigroup

1/24/2006

4/2/2006

Total

Yes

No (Earnings)

2/16/2006
2/27/2006
8/28/2006
10/10/2006
11/3/2006

4/1/2006
6/30/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2007
1/1/2008

Total
Total
Partial
Partial
Partial

Yes
Yes
No (Date)
No (Date)
No (Date)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

LT Port. = Portfolio used to test long term reaction; ST Port. = Portfolio used to test short term reaction
Excluded Events
Firm
Sprint Nextel
Hospira
Sears Holdings

Freeze Date
Nov. 2005
Q2 2004
5/9/2005

Reason for Exclusion
Estimation period is pre Nextel purchase (12/15/2005, announced 8/15/2005)
Freeze was in association with spin-off from Abbott
Estimation security is K-mart, which was emerging from Ch.11 at the time

Sources: Center for Retirement Research (2007), news articles, SEC filings, and press releases.
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Table 2. Short Term Portfolio Results
(-30,-1)

15

1.68%

1.82%

Patell ZScore
0.757

(-1,+1)
(+1,+50)

15
15

-0.06%
-0.65%

-0.05%
-0.33%

-0.107
0.818

Windows

Events

ACAR

CAAR

0.2244

CAAR
Pos:Neg
9:06

Sign ZScore
0.928

0.4575
0.2068

9:06
8:07

0.928
0.411

CAAR
Pos:Neg
9:05
8:06
6:08

Sign ZScore
1.183
0.648
-0.422

p-value

p-value
0.1767
0.1767
0.3404

Table 3. Long Term Portfolio Results
Windows
(-30,-1)
(-1,+1)
(+1,+50)

Events
14
14
14

ACAR
0.82%
0.40%
-2.68%

CAAR
1.07%
0.43%
-2.22%

Patell ZScore
0.671
0.284
-0.011

p-value
0.2511
0.3883
0.4957

p-value
0.1185
0.2585
0.3367

(+1,+150)

14

14.38%

15.44%

3.104

0.001

11:03

2.252

0.0122

(+1,+200)

14

20.04%

22.03%

3.986

<.0001

12:02

2.787

0.0027

(+1,+250)

14

21.90%

25.60%

4.423

<.0001

12:02

2.787

0.0027

0.2511

CAAR
Pos:Neg
9:05

Sign ZScore
1.183

0.4167

7:07

0.113

(-30,-1)

14

0.82%

1.07%

Patell ZScore
0.671

(0,+50)

14

-2.11%

-1.54%

0.21

Windows

Events

ACAR

CAAR

p-value

p-value
0.1185
0.4549

(+51,+100)

14

9.70%

9.66%

2.655

0.004

10:04

1.718

0.0429

(+101,+150)

14

7.90%

8.00%

2.733

0.0031

14:00

3.857

<.0001

(+151,+200)

14

6.20%

6.58%

2.596

0.0047

10:04

1.718

0.0429

(+201,+250)

14

2.90%

3.57%

1.923

0.0272

10:04

1.718

0.0429

=Significant at 5%
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Table 4. Sample Level CAAR - Long Term Portfolio
Window
Event

(+51,+100) (+101,+150) (+151,+200) (+201,+250)

(-30,-1) Trading Days

(+0,+250)

(0,+50)

Lexmark International

94.05%

8.23%

33.38%

16.18%

19.29%

16.96%

-0.96%

236

Coca-cola Bottling

56.94%

3.24%

28.67%

15.01%

4.76%

5.26%

7.12%

213

Verizon
Aon

43.18%
39.50%

12.78%
2.27%

-1.18%
23.00%

11.14%
18.05%

20.47%
9.31%

-0.03%
-13.13%

7.64%
0.45%

250
250

Lockheed Martin

29.82%

4.04%

8.50%

0.09%

8.74%

8.44%

-4.82%

250

ALCOA

22.52%

5.51%

11.84%

2.95%

-1.85%

4.08%

2.15%

241

NCR
IBM (2006)

21.28%
21.22%

-3.69%
-0.20%

10.66%
-0.53%

1.68%
2.13%

12.24%
14.95%

0.39%
4.87%

9.21%
-7.00%

250
247

Hewlett-Packard

20.35%

12.82%

0.61%

5.07%

-3.13%

4.98%

4.50%

250

Motorola
Sears Roebuck

18.76%
17.26%

-11.79%
-9.94%

17.65%
3.87%

5.71%
8.21%

7.49%
9.30%

-0.30%
5.82%

-1.81%
-14.79%

250
250

Ferro
IBM (2004)

9.13%
-4.59%

-8.87%
-4.12%

-2.15%
-12.60%

17.29%
2.96%

5.59%
-5.48%

-2.73%
14.65%

0.63%
3.63%

219
250

-21.59%
26.27%

-31.90%
-1.54%

13.51%
9.66%

5.59%
8.00%

-9.50%
6.58%

0.71%
3.57%

9.11%
1.08%

250

Circuit City Stores
CAAR
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Table 5. Non-Freeze Restructuring Activity Summary – Long Term Portfolio
Firm
ALCOA
Aon
Circuit City Stores
Coca-cola Bottling
Ferro
Hewlett-Packard
IBM
IBM
Lockheed Martin
Motorola
NCR
Verizon
Sears Roebuck
Lexmark International

Announcement Dates
Freeze
Restructuring
1/17/2006
Jan-05
10/28/2003
Feb-04
10/29/2004
Feb-05
2/27/2006 NA
2/16/2006
Jul-06
7/19/2005
Jul-05
1/6/2006
May-05
12/9/2004
May-05
10/6/2005
Apr-04
12/17/2004
Oct-05
5/26/2004
Nov-02
12/6/2005
Feb-05
1/28/2004
Jul-04
1/24/2006
Jan-06

Restructuing Summary
Layoff 8100 workers by mid 2006
Cut Overhead: 600 IT jobs outsourced, reduce regional offices
Close 19 stores and 1 distribution center
NA
Reduce costs $40-$60 million per year by 2009, asset write-offs, layoffs
14,500 employees laidoff, considered "expected"
Layoff 10,000-13,000 workers (4% of labor force), reorganize european ops.
Layoff 10,000-13,000 workers, reorganize European management
Layoff 800 to 1,000 workers
Layoff 1,900 workers, improve material procurement
Layoff 1,500 workers (5% of labor force), reduce expenses by $100 million
Layoff 7,000 workers post MCI Inc. acquisition
Layoff 3,300 workers (2% of labor force), cut 64,000 jobs since 2000
Layoff 275 workers

Restructuring information was gathered from press releases, SEC filings, and news articles.
1

Deloitte (2006) provides a comprehensive overview of the PPA of 2006 and a review of existing funding and
valuation requirements.
2
Munnell et al. (2006) identify these as the four key risks firms face as DB sponsors.
3
OPEB includes post retirement health care and life insurance benefits.
4
Kieso et al. (2005) offer a summary of basic pension accounting, and we rely on this text for our income
statement and balance sheet discussion.
5
Deloitte (2006) explains that firms may choose between a segmented or blended rate.
6
VanDerhei (2006) and PBGC (2005) offer summaries and analysis of many freeze and termination studies
including Aon (2003), Mercer (2006), Towers Perrin HR Services (2004), Watson Wyatt (2005) and the 2006
version of Hewitt Associates LLC (2007).
7
Latter (2006) offers an illustration of the freeze gain/loss calculation.
8
VanDerhei (2006) calculates these contributions based upon an 8% asset return assumption and a Final
Average annuity formula.
9
Center for Retirement Research (CRR 2007) maintains an on going database of major healthy company freezes
including fact sheets on each freeze with basic information such as plan type, number of participants affected,
description of freeze, plan solvency, financial implications, dates (announced and effective) and background.
10
One exception on the M&A criterion was Sears which announced a merger with K-Mart late in the test
interval (Nov. 2004).
11
We determine the event date by analyzing the CRR pension fact sheets, company press releases, and filings,
as well as media reports.
12
Cowan (2005) is our source for market model and Eventus return formulas.
13
See Cowan (2005) for details on test statistic calculations.

